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Seigniorage, Optimal Taxation, and 
Time Consistency: A Review*
Berthold Herrendorf 




This paper reviews the existing literature on seigniorage, optimal 
taxation, and time consistency. A n  extension of the simple optim al 
taxation m odel of M ankiw (1987) serves as the unifying framework. 
Particular emphasis is put on the derivation of the consolidated  
public sector flow budget constraint from the government budget 
constraint and the central bank profit and loss account and bal­
ance sheet. W ith in  this framework, it is shown that a slightly 
modified version of the Persson, Persson and Svensson (1987) so­
lution to the tim e consistency problem, that is, specific ways of 
debt structure m anagem ent, is not only necessary but also suf­
ficient for optimality. However, this will not necessarily be true 
in more general models [Calvo and Obstfeld (1990).] In addition, 
the different recommendations of the public finance literature on 
optim al inflation, notably the Friedman (1969) rule o f constant de­
flation, positive inflation, or seigniorage m axim izing inflation, are 
shown to be specific time consistent solutions to the optim al tax 
problem. The m odel is deliberately kept as simple as possible to  
make the analysis accessible for non-specialists.
*1 would like to thank Carsten Folkertsma, Wolfgang Peters, Louis Phlips, and 
Gunter Rehme for useful comments. I am particularly indebted to Mark Salmon and 
Akos Valentinyi for many stimulating discussions and various suggestions that have 
improved the different versions of this paper. Financial support from the European 
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If not mentioned explicitly, the following conventions are followed: 
upper case letters denote nominal variables and lower case letters real 
variables,
a time index t denotes end of period t values,
a superscript e indicates values that were expected at the end of the 
former period.
In addition, the following notation is applied:
bt : stock of government bonds held by private agents at the end of period
t,
b f : stock of government bonds held by the central bank at the end of 
period f,
b\ot : total stock of all government bonds outstanding at the end of period
t,
ct : credit the central bank gives to the private sector (put differently: the 
stock of privately issued bonds held by the central bank), 
dt : real net indebtedness of the public sector, i.e. the difference between 
the stock of government bonds held by the private sector and the stock 
of private assets held by the central bank, 
gt : real government expenditure,
Wt '■ Hamiltonian of the public sector optimization problem,
i( : nominal interest rate paid at the end of period t on the end of period
t — 1 assets (either issued by the government or by private agents,





























































































lti : social losses from output taxation,
lt2 : social losses as a consequence of suboptimal holdings of real balances, 
lt3 : all social losses from inflation surprises,
mt : real balances private agents at the end of period t — 1 plan to hold 
at the end of period t,
Mt : nominal balances at the end of period t,
ot : operation costs of the central bank (will for convenience be set equal 
to zero later on),
Pt : nominal price level,
rt : domestic real rate of interest between the end of period t — l and the 
end of period t ,
Rt — rii=i 1/(1 +  ri) '■ real interest or discount factor to calculate the 
present value of a variable at the end of period t, 
st : all seigniorage revenues, 
s* : seigniorage from expected inflation, 
s* : seigniorage from surprise inflation,
sst : seigniorage from surprise inflation when the expected inflation rate is
t ,
xt : central bank profit, 
yt : real output,
0( =  nU i 1/(1 +  h) ■ time preference factor the public sector uses to 
discount the social losses of period t to its period 0 present value,
A* : current value multiplier of the Hamiltonian R t,
7r( : inflation rate between the end of period t — 1 and the end of period t, 
7 : inflation rate expected at the end of period t — 1 for period t,
7T* : unexpected inflation rate or inflation surprise between the end of 
period t — 1 and the end of period f,
7r : highest possible inflation rate, 
rt : average output tax,
=  rii=i(l +  w,-) : growth factor of real balances between the end of 
























































































































































































Seigniorage, or the public sector’s revenue from the creation of money, 
has attracted a great deal of attention in monetary theory following the 
initial discussion by Keynes (1923) and the pathbreaking formal analysis 
of Bailey (1956).1 In part, recent interest in the issue has clearly been 
related to the role of the EMS and the establishment of a European central 
bank.2 The budgetary problems of the Eastern European states after the 
structural break in 1989 have also drawn attention to the importance of 
seigniorage as a revenue instrument. Most of the emerging democracies 
are highly dependent on seigniorage because they usually have poorly 
developed excise and income taxation systems together with significant 
black market activities, rather underdeveloped domestic capital markets, 
and only limited access to international capital markets. Oblath and 
Valentinyi (1993) indicate how important seigniorage is quantitatively in 
Eastern Europe. For Hungary, which is among the more stable Eastern 
European countries, they value the average share of the revenues from 
money creation at 3.5 percent of GDP over the period of 1989-1992 with 
a peak of 5.1 percent in 1991. If one considers the recognized budgetary 
role that seigniorage already plays in Southern European countries it is 
seems that the scale of these figures is not unrealistic; Southern European 
countries after all have more fertile alternative revenue sources.3
Given the vast scale of the literature on seigniorage, it is surpris­
ing that no detailed survey of the public finance theory of seigniorage is 
available. Reasons for this may include the different modeling approaches
1See also Friedman (1953).
2Compare for instance Dornbusch (1988), Drazen (1989) or Grilli (1989).
3Fischer (1982) for instance estimates the Italian seigniorage between 1973 and 
1978 as 3.9 percent of GNP. For the period from 1980 until 1990, Repullo (1991) 
finds in the case of Spain an average amount of seigniorage of 3.98 percent of GDP. 
The figure for Italy, however, seems to be a little too high, which could be explained 
with Fischer’s rather crude measure of seigniorage as being simply the change in base 
money, see Klein and Neumann (1990). Using a more sophisticated measure, Bruni, 
Penati and Porta (1989) calculate Italian seigniorage as 2.1 percent of GDP between 
1976 and 1981 and as 1.7 percent of between 1982 and 1987. And finally, Fischer and 
Easterley (1990) on page 133 find it “safe to argue that rates of seigniorage of much 




























































































used in the literature as well as the range of results found. For instance, 
earlier authors often addressed the issue by asking which rate of inflation 
maximized public revenues whereas Phelps (1973) in his path-breaking 
integration of inflation within a modern public finance framework of opti­
mal taxation stressed the optimal mix of all possible revenue sources. In 
this context, optimality (from a public finance point of view) means that 
a mix of the different revenue instruments raises the required revenues at 
the lowest possible welfare costs. However, as the literature stimulated 
by Phelps’ idea has shown, optimal inflation rates may either be either 
positive or negative, depending on how efficient are alternative revenue 
instruments like output taxes.4 The only consensus in monetary theory 
seems to be that the optimal inflation rate in general does not imply 
maximizing seigniorage.
Another strand of the literature has focussed on the inherent time 
consistency problem, which has been well known since Calvo (1978) ap­
plied the classic ideas exposed in Kydland and Prescott (1977) to mone­
tary economics. In this context, the question of time inconsistency arises 
because after individuals have chosen their holdings of nominal balances 
unexpected inflation allows the public sector to devalue the real value of 
nominal balances. Thereby it can reduce its liabilities vis a vis the private 
sector and collect revenues at social costs lower than the ones resulting 
from alternative revenue instruments. Irrespective of the importance of 
this problem, however, the time inconsistency problem is often assumed 
away in the public finance literature on optimal seigniorage by restricting 
attention to situations in which the policy maker is precommited to the 
ex ante optimal policy.
In contrast, this paper does not ignore the time consistency prob­
lem, but offers a simple framework within which many of the results of the 
public finance literature on optimal inflation can be encompassed as time 
consistent solutions to the optimal tax problem. The plan of the paper 
is as follows: Section 2 contains an extension of the model suggested by 
Mankiw (1987), who incorporated inflation taxes into the optimal output
4 As will become clear later, negative inflation rates result when it is optimal to 




























































































taxation framework of Barro (1979).s Particular emphasis is put on the 
derivation of the consolidated public sector flow budget constraint and 
of seigniorage from the government budget constraint, the central bank 
profit and loss account, and the central bank balance sheet [in the sub­
sections 2.1 and 2.2, respectively]. The social losses resulting from the 
use of the different revenue instruments will be justified in 2.3. In sec­
tion 3, the time inconsistency of the optimal policy is studied. To have a 
benchmark case, subsection 3.1 contains the solution of the optimal tax 
problem under precommitment. The time inconsistency of the optimal 
policy is shown in 3.2 while the time consistent solution under discretion 
is characterized in 3.3. Section 4 offers a brief review of the different 
solutions to the time consistency problem, notably reputational mecha­
nisms [in subsection 4.2] and specific management of public assets and 
debt as has been suggested by Persson et al. (1987) [in subsection 4.2]. 
The Persson, Persson and Svensson suggestion then is formally discussed 
as a solution to the time consistency problem in section 5. In particular, 
it will be shown that in our set-up a slightly modified version of their 
solution is not only necessary, but also sufficient for optimality, although 
this will not necessarily be true in more general models [Calvo and Ob- 
stfeld (1990) and Persson, Persson and Svensson (1989)]. Section 6 offers 
some interpretations of the optimal policy. In subsection 6.1, the Ramsey 
principle of optimal taxation is related to the solution found in this paper. 
The different recommendations of the public finance literature on optimal 
inflation [Friedman (1969) rule, positive or even seigniorage maximizing 
inflation rates] are shown to be specific time consistent solutions to the 
optimal tax problem [in subsection 6.2]. Subsection 6.3 briefly touched 
the question to which extent our results generalize to general equilibrium 
models of optimal taxation. Finally, section 7 concludes.
1 The Optimal Tax Problem
In what follows, we deal with the government and the central bank as if 
they were one institution, called the public sector. This is, for example, 5




























































































appropriate when the central bank is totally dependent on the govern­
ment, a paradigm that is true for many countries.6 The public sector 
in our closed economy has to finance an exogenous stream of expendi­
ture through the revenues from taxing a homogeneous output good and 
through seigniorage.7 The use of both revenue instruments causes welfare 
losses. The optimal tax problem is thus to find a sequence of taxes and 
seigniorage that minimize the present value of the social losses while sat­
isfying the intertemporal budget constraint.8 In the following subsection, 
this constraint is derived.
1.1 T h e Consolidated Public Sector B udget C on­
straint
To concentrate on the issues related to seigniorage, we assume that the 
stream of the nominal homogeneous output good Y<s,Y\,Y2, . . .  is exoge­
nously given. For simplicity the analysis is moreover restricted to a deter­
ministic environment; all realizations of exogenous variables other than 
the policy instruments are hence known with certainty. If r< denotes the 
average tax rate, the nominal tax revenues Tt can be expressed as:
Tt =  rtYt. (1)
In addition to financing its expenditures Go,G i ,G 2, ■ ■ . through output 
taxation and central bank profit X t, the government also raises funds 
through increasing the stock B\ot of nominal government bonds. The 
stylized government flow budget constraint in nominal terms, which re­
quires the equality between nominal expenditure and revenues at the end 
of any period, can therefore be written as
Gt +  itB\°\ = T t +  X t +  A B\°\ (2)
6 Concentrating on dependent central banks admittedly prevents the analysis of 
a number of important issues of “political economy.” Given the space constraint, 
however, we still decide to focus the present interest on this situation. For a recent 
discussion of central bank independence, see Walsh (1993).
7See Fischer (1983a) or Rogers (1989) for generalizations to endogenous government 
expenditure.




























































































where it denotes the nominal interest rate which is paid at the end of 
period t on assets issued either privately or publicly at the end of period 
t — l .9 The budget constraint in real terms follows after division of (2) 
by the nominal price level Pt. For notational convenience, let us denote 
real variables by lower case letters, which, for example, implies / Pt =
^<-i/(l + 7rt)- The government budget constraint in real terms then reads
as:
9t +  t — — b{I*! =  Tt y t +  xt +  A b\ot. (3)
1 +  7T(
In (3), 7rt stands for the rate of inflation between the end of period t — 1 
and the end of period t:
*t





So far, money has not had a role in our endowment economy. We therefore 
assume that legal restrictions require individuals to pay any purchases 
of other individual’s endowment in cash.10 * To determine the domestic 
price level and central bank profit we postulate the existence of a stable 
aggregate relation between output, nominal interest rates and the demand 
for real balances in the economy. Let mt(yt,it) denote the real balances 
private agents at the end of period t — 1 plan to hold at the end of period 
t when they expect an inflation rate of 7rf .u The partial derivatives of 
real balances are assumed to reflect the standard transaction and store of 
value motive:12
dmt(yt,i t)  ̂ dmt(yt,i t) _ 
dyt ’ dit (5)
9Note that for simplicity we assume the nominal interest rate on all bonds in the 
economy to be the same.
10 This is in some sense similar to the legal restriction usually assumed when cash in 
advance constraints are modeled.
1]The index t on mt indicates that the demand for real balances may also depend 
on influences other than the nominal interest rate and real output, for example, on 
changes of the financial technology.
12Note that it is possible to a certain extent to justify this form of the demand for 
real balances by intertemporal optimization behavior of private agents [See Aizenman 
(1989), in particular the appendix therein, and Calvo and Guidotti (1993)]. It should 
also be mentioned that the dependence of desired real balances on expected inflation is 
to be modeled particularly carefully in order to avoid the Lucas critique when working 




























































































In order to determine the demand for nominal balances at the end of 
period t — 1, we additionally assume that, given the expected price level 
for the next period P(e, private agents achieve the desired level of expected 
real balances mt at the end of t — 1; i.e.
M d
- p r  =  mt(yt,i t). (6)
For a given price expectation Pte, the equality of the supply and demand 
of nominal balances then determines the price level at the end of period 
t -  1:
Mt-i  =  mt(yt,i t)Pte =  mt(yt,i t)Pt- i( l  +  net )
■ p  _______ Mt-\_____
i_1 <«)(! +  »?)' { )
We amy observe that the price level both directly and indirectly depends 
on the expected inflation rate, given that the expected inflation rate af­
fects the nominal interest rate. To model this we make the simple assump­
tion that the nominal interest rate is determined by the Fisher relation,
i.e. that nominal interest payments fully compensate expected inflation:
(1 -I- it) =  (1 +  rt)(l +  7rte) or it =  rt +  +  rt7rte. (8)
If we finally assume that the domestic real interest rate is exogenously 
given too, we are left with the expected inflation rate as the only endoge­
nous variable affecting the demand for real balances:13
mt{yt,ii) =  mt(yu rt +  (1 +  r()7r(e) =  m((7rtc). (9)
For any given expectations of the inflation rate there is therefore a one to 
one relation between the money supply and the price level and thus the 
actual inflation rate in our model. We may thus take the actual inflation 
rate and not the money supply as the policy instrument for analytical 
convenience.14
13In a closed economy, a constant real interest rate would obtain, for example, if 
consumers utility were linear in consumption [compare Obstfeld (1991)].





























































































We now explicitly derive an expression for central bank profit xt, 
since this is the only item in the budget constraint of the public sector 
that has not yet been discussed. The stylized central bank profit and loss 
account may be written as:15
xt =
itBt-i +  itCt-i — Ot
( 10)
where B _̂j and Ct~ 1 denote the nominal value of the stock of government 
bonds and of privately issued assets held by the central bank at the end of 
period t — 1, respectively. Ot represents the operation costs of the central 
bank. Equation (10) expresses that real central bank profits equal the 
difference between interest payments on the end of last period’s stock of 
central bank assets and its operational costs.16
In addition to the central bank profit and loss account, the monetary 
balance sheet of the central bank is crucial for the derivation of its profits. 
It shows that changes in the supply of (base) money Mt result from open 
market operations:
Mt -  Mt. A B f  +  A Ct
( 11)
Substituting expression (11) into (10), we find that central bank profit 
may be written as:
xt = AM, +  i t iB t ,  +  C,_i) -  A (B f  +  Ct) -  Ot
Pt
( 12)
As shown in Appendix A, substituting (12) into the government budget 
constraint (3) yields a form of the consolidated budget constraint of the 
public sector, in which the role of the alternative revenue instruments 
becomes clear:
9t +  (1 +  rt)bt-i +  Of — Ttyt +  st +  bt, (13)
I5Similar approaches can be found in Klein and Neumann (1990) and in Repullo 
(1991).
16Note that we have explicitly assumed that the nominal interest rate paid on gov­
ernment bonds is the same as the one paid on private bonds. This excludes the 
possibility of implicit subsidies of the private sector through below market interest 



























































































where &t_j =  b\°lx — bf_x is the real value of the end of period t — 1 stock of 
government bonds not held by the central bank and st is seigniorage. In 
the next subsection we discuss the components of st; note that the poten­
tial revenues due to a devaluation of government debt after unexpected 
inflation are also included in st. This explains the term (1 +  rt)bt-\ on 
the left hand side of the equality sign of (13).17
1.2 Seigniorage from  E xp ected  and from  Surprise 
Inflation







-  +  W7 ~ wr(! +Pt Pte Pt
ACt Ot
Pt Pt
[(1 + < +1)mt+1« +1) -  c(] -  i ± ^ . [ m((7rte) -  (1 +  rt)ct_i]
+ T T ^ ( l + r‘ )6‘ - i - ° ‘ - (14)i  +  7T(
The real seigniorage revenues in (14) have five components, reflecting the 
revenues from expected and from unexpected inflation:
1. The real value of the additional nominal balances the private sec­
tor has to acquire at the end of period t to achieve expected real 
balances equal to desired real balances mt+i(fif+1).
2. The real value of interest payments itCt-\/Pt on the end of last 
period’s stock of private assets held by the central bank.
3. The end of period t difference between the expected real value of 
government debt (issued at the end of period t — 1) and its actual 
value.18
17See Calvo and Guidotti (1990) for a similar point of view.
18Note that government debt enters the expression for seigniorage differently from 
central bank assets. While all changes of the stock of central bank assets and the real 
value of interest payments affect seigniorage, only changes of the value of government 




























































































4. The real value of additional credit A Ct/Pt the central bank gives 
to others than the government.
5. The operational costs of the central bank ot, which for convenience 
we set equal to zero from now on.19 20
Since we are interested in the time inconsistency issue of monetary policy 
within an optimal taxation framework, it is useful to distinguish between 
the seigniorage revenues due to both expected and unexpected inflation. 
In what follows, a superscript e will indicate the component of a variable 
that was expected at the end of last period and a superscript s will stand 
for the surprise or unexpected component. With this convention, the 
seigniorage revenues in the current period for instance are simply:
st =  s* +  sst. (15)
By setting nt equal to ir* so that there is no surprise inflation, the expected 
real seigniorage revenues follow directly from the expression (14) for the 
total real seigniorage revenues:
® ? « u )  =  K+ imt+ iK +i) +  [ % i (< + i )  -  "»((< )] +  net-1 -  [n -  c<_i] 
=  [(1 +  7r<+i)m<+i(7rt+i) -  C(] -  [mt{< )  -  (1 +  rt)ct_ j ] . (16)
To understand the implications of this expression more deeply, the ex­
pected real seigniorage revenues for two extreme cases are considered 
20now:zu
1. The central bank implements monetary policy solely through open 
market operations in government bonds:
In this case, the credit extended to the private sector is equal to 
zero and the expected real seigniorage revenues are:
st =  ~  " * < « ) ] .  (17)
19This not to say that these costs can be neglected. Klein and Neumann for instance 
estimate the operation costs of the Deutsche Bundesbank at around 10 % of the total 
seigniorage in the 1980s. They are however assumed to be exogenous given the present 
interest.




























































































Expected seigniorage hence only results from changes in base money. 
For this reason, (17) has at times been called the cash-flow or mon­
etary measure of seigniorage.21 In particular, the first term on the 
right hand side of (17) arises as a consequence of an erosion of the 
real value of nominal balances that private agents will want to hold 
constant in a stationary state (with constant real interest rates and 
real output). In contrast, the second term on the right hand side 
arises even if the inflation rate is constant because private agents 
want to adjust their real balances if the real interest rate, real out­
put, or any other exogenous variable changes. For example, as 
Friedman (1971) has argued real output growth increases seignior­
age for a given inflation rate by increasing desired real balances.22
2. The central bank implements monetary policy solely through open 
market operations in bonds issued privately:
The expected revenues from inflation then correspond to the interest 
payments on the end of the last period’s stock of central bank assets 
privately issued, which is equal to the end of the last period’s stock 
of money by construction:
Pt
=  hmt. (18)
The foregone interest payments for holding non interest bearing do­
mestic money instead of interest bearing securities now measure 
the revenue from the creation of money. The right hand side of 
(18) is therefore usually called the opportunity cost measure of 
seigniorage.23
2lSee Repullo (1991) or Klein and Neumann (1990).
22Some authors, for instance Anand and van Wijnbergen (1989), make a distinction 
between inflation tax and seigniorage. They coin the item 7Tj+1mt+i in (17) the in­
flation tax (with 7Tj+] being the tax rate and m,t+1 being the inflation base) and the 
item (m 1+i — mt) seigniorage. The sum of both is then referred to as the revenues 
from money creation or monetization. We do not want to make this distinction here 
but rather call all revenues from money creation seigniorage (or equivalently inflation 
taxes), because what Anand and van Wijnbergen call seigniorage also has a tax aspect 
in that it implies a transfer of real resources from the private to the public sector.




























































































Although these two measures look rather different and it has been dis­
puted which is the right one to use for empirical work, they are in- 
tertemporally equivalent.24 More generally, the present value of expected 
seigniorage is independent of the implementation of monetary policy. To 
see this, define the market discount factor as:
< 1
/?_i =  l +  ro, R0 =  1, =  U  q—;— • (19)
,=i 1 +  re­
using the Fisher relation (8) and the identity Rt( 1 +  rt) =  R 
find the present value of seigniorage is given by:
OO OO /•
J 2 Rtst =  +  7r'+i)m(+ i(7r<+i) -  c<] -  {mtW )  -  (!
t=0 t=0 L
oo oo
=  Y , Rt+i{l +  U+i)mi+i{Tret+1) -Y ^ R tm tK )
t=0 t=0
oo oo
+  ^2 ^ tCt ~  ^2
t=0 t=0
oo
= ^i?(bm ((7r(e) + (i + r0)c_i -  m0, (20)
t= l
where c_i is the end of period -1 stock of privately issued bonds that are 
held by the central bank and m0 is the real, expected end of period t 
value of the end of period t — 1 stock oi nominal balances.
We now turn to the revenues from surprise inflation. If we sub­
tract the expected seigniorage (16) from total seigniorage (14), we get 
the revenues from surprise inflation:
S?W) =  1 +  +  [ " * « « )  +  U +  rt)(bt-i ~ Ct-r)] ■ (21)
As long as the public sector is a net debtor of the private sector, the rev­
enues from unexpected inflation are positive and increase with increasing 
inflation surprises. These revenues come about for two reasons: On the 
one hand, government debt and private assets are not protected against 
inflation surprises as long as they are not indexed. If the public sector is
24This has been pointed out by, among others, Repullo (1991).
(_i, we then




























































































a net debtor vis a vis the private sector it can devalue its net liabilities 
through the use of unexpected inflation. On the other hand, we have 
assumed that the nominal balances carried over to the current period are 
determined at the end of the last period before the public sector chooses 
the actual rate of inflation. The public sector can thus always devalue 
these nominal balances more than expected by the private sector. Note 
that surprise inflation devalues all nominal public liabilities, whereas ex­
pected inflation only devalues the non-interest bearing ones. This holds 
true, because interest bearing public liabilities are protected against ex­
pected inflation when the Fisher relation is valid.
To simplify the notation, let us call the real net indebtedness of the 
public sector dt:
dt = b t — ct. (22)
After the substitution of (22) and the expressions for expected and un­
expected seigniorage, (16) and (21), into the budget constraint (13), we 
arrive at a form of the consolidated public sector budget constraint that 
will be used in the following chapters:
dt = gt +  (1 +  rt)dt - 1  -  Ttyt -  set {ir'+1) -  sst(n‘ ). (23)
Equation (23) determines the real value of the net indebtedness dt that 
the public sector has to issue at the end of period t. It has to equal the 
difference between real expenditure plus the real indebtedness at the end 
of period t, which was expected at the end of period t — 1 on the one hand 
and the sum of taxation revenues plus expected and surprise seigniorage 
on the other hand.
1.3 Social Losses from  Taxation and Inflation
To formulate the optimal tax problem of the public sector, the welfare 
losses resulting from the use of the different policy instruments still need 
to be specified. We assume the social losses as perceived by the policy 
maker take the following additive form in each period:




























































































with lti(0) =  /(,(()) =  0 and l'ti > 0, >  0 when the argument is not
equal to zero (i — 1 ,... 3). The specification of equation (24) includes 
the following assumptions: The social losses at any point in time are 
supposed to depend positively and convexly on each of the different policy 
instruments. They are allowed to change over time, for instance with 
changes of real output or financial technology. Furthermore, social losses 
from the use of any policy instrument are assumed to be zero whenever 
that instrument is not used. Finally, our specification of the loss function 
is separable in the different arguments.25
In particular, we may distinguish the following sources of social 
loss:26
1. Social losses from the use of the endowment tax may arise from 
collection or enforcement costs. They can intuitively be motivated 
by assuming that individuals try to avoid taxes more rigorously, 
the more utility they have to sacrifice as a consequence of reduced 
consumption. If utility has the standard convexity properties, these 
activities are intensified more than proportionally with increasing 
average taxes. The collection costs hence increase convexly in the 
average tax rate too.27
2. Anticipated inflation causes social losses because it leads to subop- 
timal holdings of real balances and thereby increased transaction 
costs and decreased social welfare. These additional costs do not 
arise when the satiation level of desired real balances is held, which 
is the case if the nominal iriterest rate and is zero, implying zero 
opportunity costs of holding money.28
25This assumption is used for simplicity, although it excludes situations in which 
the use of a policy instrument influences the losses incurred from other instruments. 
For example, in our set-up, inflation cannot increase the real collection costs of the 
endowment tax if there are significant collection lags. [See Tanzi (1977) for the classic 
argument on collection costs due to inflation and Dixit ’(1991) for a reinterpretation.]
26See.Fischer and Modigliani (1979), Fischer (1983b),.or Driffill, Mizon and Ulph 
(1990) for a more detailed discussion of the different losses from inflation.
27Note that they do not appear in the public sector budget constraint, because 
we implicitly assume that private agents have to pay them in addition to their tax 
payments.




























































































3. In contrast to anticipated inflation, surprise inflation does not cause 
social losses from suboptimally low real balances because private 
agents have already determined their desired holdings of nominal 
balances when the authority decides whether to create inflation sur­
prises or not. The costs of surprise inflation come instead from 
menu costs and from unwanted redistribution among private agents 
(if they use contracts based on nominal price expectations). Note 
that these costs do not arise from expected inflation because private 
agents will adjust their contracts.29
We have now extended Mankiw (1987)’s model to a framework, in which 
we can discuss the time consistency problem of the optimal policy.30
2 The Time Consistency Problem of the 
Optimal Inflation Policy
In this section, we show that the best achievable policy is not time con­
sistent in general and discuss what the time consistent policy under dis­
cretion is.
of seigniorage and optimal taxation by a the use of a transactions technology. He 
assumed real balances to be an input good of this technology, which decrease the time 
devoted to unproductive ’shopping activities.’
29 In the literature, it has been debated whether the policy maker is only concerned 
with the social losses from expected inflation or also with the ones from unexpected 
inflation. [Compare for example Kydland and Prescott (1977), Barro (1983), Barro 
and Gordon (1983a), Barro and Gordon (1983b) and opposed to them Grossman 
(1990).] Since we are also discussing the time consistency problems of the optimal 
tax policy, we have to model the costs from surprise inflation. The omission of them 
would lead to the same mistake the original paper of Persson et al. (1987) was flawed 
with. [See Calvo and Obstfeld (1990) and Persson et al. (1989).]
30 More rudimentary versions of Mankiw’s model have been applied by Roubini and 
Sachs (1989), Grilli (1989), Yashiv (1989), Poterba and Rotemberg (1990), Trehan 




























































































2.1 T h e Solution to  the O ptim al Tax P roblem  U n ­
der P recom m itm ent
As a benchmark case, we first want to study the optimal tax policy un­
der precommitment. The term precommitment implies that the public 
sector can credibly bind itself to follow announced policies. In particular, 
unexpected inflation is not in this case available as a policy instrument. 
The possibility to precommit simplifies the public optimization problem 
considerably because the expected inflation rate must equal the actual 
rate. It is thus rational for the private sector to expect the inflation rate 
that is ex ante optimal from the authority’s point of view. Consequently, 
the public sector can act as a Stackelberg leader, who, taking account of 
the Stackelberg follower’s reaction, chooses the optimal expected infla­
tion rate and precommits to stick to it in the future. On the other hand, 
the private sector is the Stackelberg follower, who reacts to the leader’s 
inflation announcement by adjusting its real balances.
If the public discount factor 0 ( is defined as:
e ‘ =  r i r T T ’ 0 < * < 1 ,  (25)
,= i 1 +
the optimal tax problem under precommitment is to choose rt and 7Tj+1 so 
as to minimize 0* [l(i(r() +  lai}t+1)] subject to (23) with ss =  0 and
(8) and (16) substituted in. In order to characterize the solutions under 
precommitment, we define the discrete Hamiltonian with the co-state 
variable At (in current value notation) t =  0 ,1 ,2 ,...:
?f((d<-i> Tt, 7T(+i, A<) =  \lti(Tt) +  ta(*m)]
+  A( \gt +  (1 +  r«)d(_i — Ttyt — s?(7T(+1)] • (26)
In addition to (23) with ss =  0, the first order conditions are:31
HTt — —x-------- t̂Vt — 0, (27.a)OTt





























































































dla{it+i) x dset---  ̂ I-------- ' (27-b)
(27.c)
Moreover, the following transversality condition must be satisfied:
If all instruments cause social losses, the policy characterized by these 
first order conditions must results in the highest achievable social welfare, 
compared to all time consistent alternatives. We thus call it the ex ante 
optimal policy.32
2.2  T h e T im e Inconsistency P roblem  U nder D is­
cretion
In this section, it is shown that the policy optimal under precommitment 
is in general time inconsistent when the authorities have discretion over 
the policy instruments. Under discretion, a policy plan is called time in­
consistent when it is ex-ante but not ex-post optimal. Put differently, an 
optimal policy is time inconsistent when the announced or planned future 
policy determined as optimal at the initial date is no longer found to be 
optimal from the viewpoint of a later date, although no new information 
has arrived in the meantime.
One of the first to point out the potential importance of time incon­
sistency in monetary economics was Auernheimer (1974). Following the 
general analysis of Kydland and Prescott (1977), Calvo (1978) and Lu­
cas and Stokey (1983) proved that the inflation pattern, which is optimal 
from a public finance point of view, is in general time inconsistent under 
discretion.33 The source of the time inconsistency in all of these models
32 In the literature, this policy is sometimes also called the “second best policy” or 
the “best second best policy” . Note that first best policies are not achievable since 
there is no loss free instrument available.
33More generally, Strotz (1955) appears to be the first to recognize the problem of 
time inconsistency in economic decision making. He shows that for an intertemporally




























































































is exactly the same as in ours; the private sector has to determine its 
optimal holdings of real balances on the basis of its rational expectations 
of inflation before the public sector chooses the actual inflation rate.
To formally show the time inconsistency of the ex ante optimal 
policy under discretion, we first observe that it coincides with the optimal 
policy under precommitment. This holds true because inflation surprises 
are not an ex ante policy instrument. We thus have to prove that, given 
individuals believe in the authority’s inflation announcement, the optimal 
precommitment policy is no longer optimal under discretion. Without loss 
of generality, let us concentrate on the problems at the end of the periods 
zero and one. We want to argued indirectly now and thus assume that at 
the end of period zero individuals find the inflation rate credible that was 
optimal under precommitment. We then show that when the authority 
has discretion over the policy instruments at the end of period one, it will 
create surprise inflation. The optimal tax problem under discretion at 
the end of period one then is to choose rt, 7r(e+1, and tt* so as to minimize 
£ £ 10 ,[ln (n) +  M*<+i) +  ft3(7r<)] subject to (23) with (8), (16) and (21) 
substituted in. The discrete Hamiltonian for t =  1,2 . . .  under discretion 
becomes:
7~Lt{dt-\, Tt, 7T(e+ i ,  7r", A() — \ltl(Tt) +  lt2(it+l) +  lt3{^t)\ (28)
+  At[gt +  (1 +  rt)dt- i  -  Ttyt -  sJK+i) ~ s?W )]-
In addition to (23) and the standard transversality condition, the first 
order conditions are:
OTt
_  dla {it+\) . ds\ 
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1 +  6,




t =  l,2 ,..(29.d)
optimizing individual, yesterday’s optimal choice will not necessarily be optimal to­
morrow, unless the discount factor consistently translates today’s valuation of a future 































































































1 + < :[ "* < « )  +  ( 1 + ^ ) 4(1 +  net +  ni)2 I
To see the time inconsistency, first note that by (29.a) and (29.b), the 
Lagrange multiplier is positive whenever the optimal tax rate or inflation 
rate is positive. Together with (29.c), this implies that the time consistent 
choice 7Tj =  0 is not optimal in general because at 7r( =  0 the derivative 
of the Hamiltonian with respect to nst is not equal to zero unless the net 
nominal liabilities of the public sector are zero:
1
H+\ =  -At
• K = o  1 +  7lf
mt(net ) +  (1 +  rt)dt-i ±  0.
mt(net ) +  (1 +  r4)d/_1] ^  0
(30)
If, for example, the net nominal liabilities of the public sector are positive, 
the marginal increase of unexpected inflation away from zero generates 
additional revenues by devaluing the public net nominal liabilities while 
the marginal losses are zero. Surprise inflation will hence be used and the 
optimal policy is not time consistent.
2.3  The T im e Consistent Solution U nder D iscre­
tion
In this section, we briefly study the time consistent solution under discre­
tion. Since rational private agents understand that the precommitment 
solution is time inconsistent under discretion, they will not base their 
decisions on the inflation expectations that would be optimal under pre­
commitment. Agents rather expected an inflation rate that does not 
give the public sector an incentive to deviate and the authority looses its 
Stackelberg leadership. In our model, the highest technologically feasible 
inflation rate protects individuals from inflation surprises. Let us denote 
such an inflation rate by n, assuming that it is finite; for simplicity, we 
also assume that it is time invariant and exogenously given.34 The public 
optimization problem then changes substantially because the authority
34See Grossman and Van Huyck (1986) for a discussion on the existence of such 




























































































now has to take tt as given and the two choice variables it is left with are 
rt and 7r*. Since the marginal revenue from inflation surprises is positive,
9sst
Ô7T?
1 +  7T
(1  +  7T +  7T f ) 2
[mt(7r) +  (1 +  rt)d,_i] > 0. (31)
and since 7f is already the highest feasible inflation rate, the public sec­
tor can only create surprise deflation. However, a marginal decrease of fr 
would result in marginal revenue losses while the marginal social losses 
are zero; it thus cannot be optimal to create surprise inflation when in­
dividuals expect ft. In addition to (23) with 7if+1 =  7f and ss =  0, the 
first order conditions, which characterize the time consistent equilibrium 
under discretion, are:




1 + 0 *
0,
l +  rt 
1 +  0*
(32.a) 
(32-b)
It should be stressed that this discretionary equilibrium is welfare inferior 
compared to the precommitment policy since the highest possible inflation 
rate is in general not the optimal one. Put differently, as a consequence 
of loosing its Stackelberg leadership, the public sector is left with the 
average tax rate as the only instrument compared to the two instruments 
under precommitment. This in general results in suboptimality.35
3 A Brief Review of the Different Solu­
tions to the Time Consistency Problem
Having realized the welfare inferiority of the outcome in a discretionary 
equilibrium, it is natural to look for possibilities to improve upon it. The
of a highest possible inflation if we had chosen to spe’cify the marginal losses from 
inflation surprises to convexly increase with increasing expected, inflation. [Compare, 
for example, Barro and Gordon (1983a), Barro and Gordon (1983b)]. However, this 
would have complicated the rest of the analysis considerably since we would have to 
give up the separability between expected and unexpected inflation.
35See Kydland and Prescott (1977), Fischer (1980), Barro and Gordon (1983a), and 




























































































easiest way out of the time consistency problem of course is to assume 
that the public sector can credibly precommit not to use surprise inflation. 
Many authors, who wanted to concentrate on the public finance aspects 
of the optimal tax package, have made this assumption.36 Although it 
may be appropriate to concentrate on the precommitment solution when 
the central bank, like the Bundesbank, is institutionally independent of 
the government, it is generally accepted that many countries do not have 
access to such a precommitment technology.
A possible reaction to this problem is to advocate institutional re­
forms, for example, with the aim to give the central bank more inde­
pendence from the government.37 Sometimes constitutional amendments 
have even been suggested as a solution to the time inconsistency problem 
in order to force the policy maker to follow a fixed rule, thus prevent­
ing the discretionary use of surprise inflation.38 Although these ideas are 
very important when there are political majorities in favor of a substan­
tial reform of the institutional environment, it may not be easy to find 
democratic support for them in other situations, at least not in the short 
run. This is not to say that institutional reforms are an unrealistic or 
unworthy goal for the long run. It rather reflects our interest in solu­
tions that can be implemented without the approval of the legislature, 
that is, reputational equilibria and specific ways of using asset and debt 
management to overcome the problem.
36For example, Drazen (1979), Kimbrough (1986a), Mankiw (1987), Grill! (1989), 
Vegh (1989b), Yashiv (1989), Dixit (1991), or Calvo and Leiderman (1992) all discuss 
only precommitment solutions.
37Rogoff (1985) suggestion of appointing a “conservative” central banker, who places 
a higher weight on price stability than society, goes in this direction. Moreover, in the 
vivid discussion on the set-up of a European central bank, this idea has frequently 
been taken up.See Eichengreen (1993).
38Compare Kydland and Prescott (1977). It should be mentioned that it may not 
even be desirable to implement rules even because any gains from imposing a rule have 
to be traded off against potential disadvantages from lost monetary flexibility. After 
the adoption of a rule, it is for example not possible to respond to contingencies not 




























































































3.1 R eputational M echanism s
Taylor (1983) appears to be the first to argue that societies sometimes 
may already have found a way out of the discretionary equilibrium by us­
ing reputational mechanisms. To outline the main idea, we first observe 
that so far we have not allowed current behavior of the public sector to 
influence the future expectations of the private sector. The easiest way 
to model such an intertemporal link is to use so called trigger strategies. 
Following for example, Grossman and Van Huyck (1986), a trigger strat­
egy may be modeled as follows in our set up: At the end of a period t, 
private agents observe last period’s actual inflation rate ftt-i- They can 
thus find out whether the public sector has followed its announcements 
or has created inflation surprises in the last period. At the same time, 
the public sector announces the inflation rate for the next period. Private 
agents are rational and hence understand that an announcement is time 
inconsistent if it is smaller than 7f. However, as long as the public sector 
has never deviated from the announced policy until the end of period 
t — 1, it is assumed to have built up a reputation for being able to re­
sist the temptation to break the rule. In this case, private agents believe 
that the public sector will not deviate in period t +  1 either. In contrast, 
if the public sector deviates once from its announcement, the trigger is 
pulled. It then looses its reputation forever and private agents expect it 
to always choose the discretionary policy, i.e. the highest technologically 
feasible inflation rate 7r.39
Confronted with a trigger strategy, the public sector faces the follow­
ing trade-off: A one period deviation from the preannouncement results 
in additional revenues from surprise inflation, which allows it to make less 
use of the future revenue instruments. Ceteris paribus, this decreases the 
social losses. In all future periods, however, private agents will expect 
the highest possible inflation rate which leads to the discretionary equi­
librium with higher social losses. The precommitment solution now is 
implementable as a so called reputational equilibrium if the present value 
of social losses without reneging is smaller than the one with reneging
39 That reputation is lost forever can be generalized by assuming that after some 




























































































Although the idea of reputational equilibria is appealing at first 
sight, there are still many problems with this approach.40 1 Since there are 
excellent surveys available on the application of reputational equilibria in 
monetary policy games, we do not elaborate on this idea here but rather 
move on to the Persson et al. (1987) solution to the time consistency 
problem.42
and it is optimal for the public sector not to create inflation surprises.40
3.2  A sset and D eb t M anagem ent
The solution to the time consistency problem through asset and debt 
management was first suggested by Lucas and Stokey (1983) for a closed 
barter economy without capital, in which the repudiation of public debt 
is excluded by assumption; capital is not modeled and a solution for Kyd- 
land and Prescott (1977)’s “classical” time consistency problem of optimal 
capital levies is thus not offered.43 In Lucas and Stokey (1983)’s model 
the time consistency problem arises because the intertemporal consump­
tion -  leisure decision is sensitive to expected changes in the distortionary 
consumption tax but cannot be changed once the future period is entered. 
Lucas and Stokey show how a specific debt structure of real indexed bonds 
can solve the time inconsistency problem by shifting debt repayments into 
periods in which the authority would otherwise tolerate higher real inter­
est rates than preannounced. Persson and Svensson (1984) have provided 
a more intuitive reinterpretation of this argument in terms of the public 
sector cash flow.
In an open economy, the Lucas and Stokey (1983) idea has also 
been investigated by Persson and Svensson (1986). They show that the 
argument can only be generalized to large open economies. In small open
40See Stokey (1989) for a general discussion of trigger strategies.
41The most important one is that, in general, there exists more than one reputational 
equilibria. It is not clear how the private sector, which is composed of a large number 
of individuals, coordinates on the most favorable one.
42See Rogoff (1987), Alesina and Tabellini (1988), Driffill (1988), Persson (1988), 
Blackburn and Christensen (1989), Rogoff (1989) and the references therein.




























































































economies, the real rate of interest is determined by the world interest 
rate and the public sector loses the possibly to affect future optimal deci­
sions through changing the real interest rate. It has thus been concluded 
that Lucas and Stokey’s argument is not valid in small open economies. 
However, in a recent paper, Huber (1992) has pointed out another way of 
restoring the time consistency of the optimal policy even in a small open 
economy. Consider for example a situation in which the public sector in 
a future period could increase social welfare by deviating from the tax­
ation scheme that is optimal from today’s point of view. When it now 
is optimal from a future point of view to cut taxes (which would lead to 
higher consumption than optimal from today’s point of view) the poten­
tial welfare gains can be offset by the right choice of consumption indexed 
public bonds which pay higher interest payments in reaction to the higher 
consumption. According to Huber, clever debt management ensures that 
the net gain from a deviation from the preannounced policy can be made 
nil. The time consistency problem of a small open barter economy can 
thus be solved too.
Finally, Persson et al. (1987) have generalized the Lucas and Stokey 
approach to a closed monetary economy. They argue that the full in­
dexation of all public debt to actual inflation in connection with the 
implementation of monetary policy via open market operations in non­
public nominal bonds of a certain maturity structure can also ensure time 
consistency when money is present in the economy. If their suggestion is 
followed, the public sector has zero nominal liabilities vis a vis the pri­
vate sector. It appears then to be quite intuitive that surprise inflation 
would not generate net gains or losses on nominal assets and liabilities 
of the public sector. Calvo and Obstfeld (1990), however, have pointed 
out that the Persson, Persson and Svensson device only satisfies the first- 
order condition for optimality, but not the second order conditions. They 
provide an example in which the interaction of today’s monetary policy 
with future interest rates can lead to future gains from surprise inflation 
although no current gains are generated. In their response to Calvo and 
Obstfeld (1990)’s comment, Persson et al. (1989) also take account of 
the social losses from surprise inflation and show that the second order 




























































































not succeed in proving that the second order conditions always hold, con­
sequently, they assume that it is true and note that “this is obviously 
not very satisfactory, but it is the usual way of proceeding in optimum 
taxation problems that are too complex for detailed examination of the 
second-order conditions” [Persson et al. (1989) on page 5)].Because the 
Persson et al. (1987) suggestion has not been dealt with intensively in 
the literature, we will discuss it formally in our model now. Within the 
framework developed above, it will be shown below that a slightly modi­
fied version of the Persson et al. (1987) suggestion leads to a unique time 
consistent policy that satisfies the first and second order conditions for 
optimality.
4 The Sufficiency of the Persson, Persson 
and Svensson Solution
The model presented in the previous sections of this paper is more specific 
than the set-up used in the literature we have just briefly reviewed. In 
particular, the real rate of interest is given and the endowment tax is 
assumed to relate to an exogenously given tax base. The time consistency 
problem investigated by Lucas and Stokey is hence not present here by 
construction. This simplification allows us to focus on the fundamental 
problems arising from the existence of money in the economy. We recall 
that from (21 ) the real value of the net nominal liabilities of the public 
sector at the end of period t is equal to
As we have seen before, the public net nominal liabilities cause the time 
consistency problem. Consequently, Persson et al. (1987) suggest that 
they be zero to achieve time consistency. This can, for instance, be at­
tained as follows:
1. All public debt is indexed to ex post inflation, which implies the full 





























































































it deviates from the expected inflation rate:
i ± ^ - k _ i  =  (l +  r4)fc-i. (34)
1 +  7r(
The real value of the public debt thus cannot be changed by surprise 
inflation anymore.
2. The nominal end of period t value of all private bonds held by the 
public sector at the end of period t — 1 has to be equal to the stock 
of nominal balances outstanding at the end of period t — 1:
Mt^  =  (l +  it)Ct̂ .  (35)
Because (35) is equivalent to
mf(7rt ) =  (1 +  rt)c(-i> (36)
the real value of the net liabilities at the end of period t of the public 
sector vis a vis the private sector is zero in this case.44
A zero nominal position of the public sector at the end of each period can 
be achieved by implementing a share of 1/(1 +it+\) x 100% of all changes 
of the money supply through open market operations in non-indexed pri­
vate bonds. Consequently, a share of it+j / ( l  +  j(+i) x 100% of all base 
money changes must be realized through open market operations in do­
mestic government bonds. For such a policy, the expected real seigniorage 
revenues at the end of period t become [compare equation (14)]:
'ÎW +1) =  T T Z — m«+i(7r<+i)
I  - r  T*4-i+  rt+ i +  rt+1 " ‘l+XPl+U
As we have discussed earlier [compare (20)], the implied base money 
changes lead to the same intertemporal seigniorage revenues as the imple­
mentation of base money changes solely through.open .market operations
44Note that this interpretation of the Persson, Persson, and Svensson idea differs 
from the suggestion in their (1987) paper in which they claim that at the end of 





























































































in government bonds. The public sector thus does not lose intertempo- 
rally when it implements monetary policy as described above. It is at 
this point natural to ask how a central bank that in the past has always 
transferred base money changes directly to the government and thus only 
holds government bonds in its portfolio can meet the requirements of 
the (modified) Persson, Persson, Svensson solution. In our simple model 
with Ricardian equivalence, in which the issue of government bonds has 
no real effects, this is straightforward: The central bank simply has to 
sell 1/(1 +it)  times 100% of its portfolio of government bonds to the pri­
vate sector. In turn, it ought to use the proceeds to buy nominal private 
assets. We conclude that it is in principle possible for a central bank to 
change its portfolio composition so as to meet the requirements just out­
lined, although this may cause real effects if Ricardian equivalence does 
not hold.45
We now formally prove the claims made above. If the net nominal 
liabilities of the public sector are always equal to zero, the revenues from 
surprise inflation are also zero independently of the choice of tt(s. The 
discrete Hamiltonian then simplifies to:
Utidt-i, rt, 7Tj+1,7r®, A() =  [Iu (r ) +  laih+i) +  t̂3C71"*)]
+  -4 [gt +  (1 +  rt)dt-1 — Ttyt — s4e« +1) ] , (38)
where:
stW + 1) =  7 7 7 - ^ + 1(4 1 )'
1 +  G + i
The first order conditions now are the law of motion for dt, (23), and:
=  5 M n ) _  =  (39.a)
OTt
45Note that Klein and Neumann (1990) have implicitly shown that the policy of 
the German Bundesbank is broadly in line with the suggestion of Persson, Persson, 
and Svensson. In particular, between 1961 and 1974, the Bundesbank transferred only 
13 percent of the revenues from money creation to the government while this value 
amounted to 73 percent between 1974 and 1987. Following Klein and Neumann, this 
phenomenon can be explained by the fact that the Bundesbank had built up a portfolio 
of net public sector wealth during the first period which then started to mature. At 




























































































(39.b)oy dlt2(it+i) , dset 
dnf+1 Xidnl4 + 1
_dit3(ii f )
n < -  ~ d ^ r  ~ °’
A(_1 =  T+e~tnd'-1 =  ï T ^ a<’ t =  1 ,2 ,‘
with [by equation (37)]: 
dset
= m»+i«n) + r r r — ri+i(
-L ■+■ » <4-19*?+1 l + r l+
Finally, the standard transversality condition has to be met:
(39.c)
(39.d)
lim Rt\tdt =  0 .t—ioo
By recursive substitution of (39.d) into the transversality condition, we 
can equivalently express the transversality condition as:
lim @(d( =  0. (39.e)t—+OC
Condition (39.e) requires that the present value of the net public debt 
(calculated with the authority’s discount factor) converge to zero as time 
tends to infinity. If the public discount factor equals the real interest rate 
this is equivalent to the well known solvency or no Ponzi-game condition, 
namely that the growth rate of the net public debt be smaller than the 
real rate of interest.46 The first order condition (39.c) implies that in an 
optimum it is necessary to set 7r* equal to zero. If a solution to the optimal 
tax problem exists, it therefore must be time consistent.47 In addition, 
from (39.a) and (39.b) it follows that in any period there is a unique pair 
(r<, 7r®+1) that satisfies the first condition, implying that there is at most 
one solution to the optimal tax problem. In order to show that the first 
order conditions actually determine a minimum of the social losses, we 
need to check the second order conditions too". Unfortunately they do
46 For an empirical test that accepts this condition for the US compare Hamilton 
and Flavin (1986).
47Note that we would not have reached this conclusion if we had neglected the social 





























































































not hold in general even in our rather simple set-up. However, the sec­
ond order conditions are met for any sequence of the revenue instruments 
that fulfills the first order conditions, if the expected seigniorage revenues 
exhibit a Laffer curve as depicted in figure l .48
Figure 1: Seigniorage Laffer Curve
m ax
The proof of this claim is delegated to appendix B. Since the first order 
conditions are satisfied by exactly one sequence of tax rates and expected 
inflation rates, we have determined a unique solution to the optimal tax 
problem. It should be stressed that modeling the social losses from sur­
prise inflation appropriately is crucial to ensure the validity of the second 
order conditions too.
48See for example figure 2 in Bailey (1956), Bruno and Fischer (1990), or Dornbusch 
and Fischer (1993) for a similar assumption. Note that we could be more general here. 
It would suffice to assume that the seigniorage revenues are concave whenever the first 
order conditions are fulfilled. Because the first order conditions imply that a minimum 
can only lie on the left side of the seigniorage Laffer curve, this could be guaranteed for 
example by the assumption that the seigniorage revenues have at most one maximum 
and are concave on the left side of it. Note that we are a little sloppy when we say 
that the optimum lies on the left side of the Laffer. As shall be seen later, the revenue 
maximizing inflation rate could also be optimal. This is thus always meant to be 




























































































5 An Interpretation of the Optimal Time 
Consistent Policy
In this section, we want to investigate the properties of the optimal solu­
tion [in the subsections 6.1 and 6.2]. In addition, we shall discuss which 
of our results may also be found in general equilibrium models of optimal 
taxation in subsection 6.3.
5.1 O ptim al Inflation and the R am sey  Principle
Eliminating the co-state variable in (39.a) and (39.b), we find that the 
optimal tax scheme apart from zero surprise inflation is characterized by 
the following necessary conditions:
dW^t+i _  dln/dTj 
dseJdnet+l ~  yt
dlti/dTt _  ( 1 + rt+1 \ dln/dxt+1
yt \i+0<+i/ yt+1
d W ^ t+ i _  (  1 +  rt+i \ dlg/dirf+2 
ds\/d7rte+i V1 +  el+1 )  dset+1/dTtet+2
Equation (40.a) is the static first order condition which requires the ratios 
of the marginal social losses to marginal taxation revenues to be equalized 
for both instruments in any period. The two following equations (40.b) 
and (40.c) are the intertemporal first-order conditions by which the dis­
counted ratios of the marginal social losses and the marginal taxation 
revenues of either instrument must also be equalized between periods in 
an optimum, implying that taxes are smoothed over time. Optimality 
hence requires that the higher the marginal social loss of an instrument 
relative to its marginal revenue, the less revenue should be collected from 
that instrument. This result directly corresponds to Ramsey’s principle 
of optimal taxation, Ramsey (1927) .49 Taking account of the public bud­
get constraint, we finally observe that optimal output taxes and inflation
49Note that if the economy is in a steady state, in which the margined losses and 































































































rates increase when the present value of the expenditure to be financed 
increases.
These considerations imply that high inflation rates may be optimal 
for essentially three reasons: First, tax enforcing and collecting authorities 
work inefficiently or tax evasion is significant. This is captured in our 
model by large marginal collection costs. Second, the interest elasticity 
of real balances is small so that high expected inflation rates lead to small 
reductions of real balances and hence small marginal social losses from 
expected inflation.50 And third, desired real balances are large for any 
given inflation rate, offering a large tax base for inflation. This would be 
the case if the financial sector is relatively underdeveloped and the bulk 
of transactions is thus facilitated in cash. Note that for these reasons, 
an active black market or shadow economy tends to increase the optimal 
inflation rate, because illegal transactions are mostly facilitated in cash 
in order to avoid taxes.51
As an additional comparative static exercise, we now want to briefly 
discuss the effects financial innovations have on the optimal inflation rates 
and on social welfare. This question for instance is important when the 
welfare effects of the introduction of new financial technologies in East­
ern Europe are to be judged. For each given rate of expected inflation, a 
financial innovation presumably reduces the desired holdings of real bal­
ances, leading to lower marginal social costs and lower marginal revenues 
from using expected inflation. The net effect on the optimal rate of in­
flation is thus ambiguous: If the marginal social costs decrease (increase) 
by more than the marginal revenue, higher (lower) optimal inflation rates
rate is equal to the real interest rate, the first order conditions even call for constant 
output taxes and constant inflation rates. This form of the tax smoothing result is 
often celebrated in the literature. Temporary changes in expenditure are financed by 
bond issues which do not have real effects in a Neo-Ricardian world. Opposed to this, 
if the public discount rate is not equal to the real interest rate, tax rates will grow or 
fall over time at a constant rate.
50 This corresponds to the intuition that more inelastic tax bases ought to be more 
heavily taxed.





























































































would result.52 Similarly, it is not at all clear how a financial innovation 
affects social welfare. Ceteris paribus, it of course increases welfare. How­
ever, it has to increase the tax rate and the rate of inflation when agents 
hold less real balances, because seigniorage revenues will also decrease. 
These higher average tax rates lower social welfare. If this effect is large 
enough, it may even overcompensate the initial welfare increase, thereby 
resulting in a negative net effect on welfare. This is the more likely to 
happen the more important seigniorage is as a source of public revenue. 
If individuals in this case reduce their desired holdings of real balances 
sharply, for example because credit cards become an accepted means of 
payment or an efficient check clearing system is installed, large increases 
in inflation may be inevitable to meet the revenue requirements.53 Au­
thorities confronted with these sort of problems thus ought to be advised 
to improve the efficiency of their tax system in order to have alternative 
revenue sources when the revenues from inflation decrease.
5.2 T h e O ptim al Inflation R ate in Specific Cases
The different recommendations of the public finance literature on optimal 
inflation rates are now shown to be special cases of our time consistent 
solution:
1. The ratio of the marginal social costs to marginal revenues 
of output taxation is large relative to that of inflation:
It is optimal to rely mainly on seigniorage to finance public expenditure. 
Rearranging (40.a) shows that for very large marginal losses from output 
taxes it is moreover optimal to choose the seigniorage maximizing inflation 
rate, for which the first derivative of expected seigniorage becomes zero:54





52Compare de Gregorio (1991) for a more detailed discussion.
53In a different context, Fischer and Summers (1989) have discussed a similar 
phenomenon.





























































































Using (37), the seigniorage maximizing inflation rate can equivalently be 
characterized by a version of the well known unit elasticity rule:55
____ U+i dmt(yt+i,it+i) _ j
mt{yt+i, *t+i) dit+i
It requires that a one percent increase of the nominal interest rate after a 
marginal increase of the expected inflation rate leads to a one percent de­
crease of real balances. This is the case when seigniorage is maximized.56
2. The ratio of the marginal social costs to marginal revenues 
of output taxation is small relative to that of seigniorage:
In this case, the optimal policy implies that a major share of the revenues 
is collected through output taxes and only a small part through seignior­
age. Moreover, if in the optimal policy the product of the marginal social 
losses from output taxes and the marginal revenue from seigniorage is 
negligible, then the marginal social losses from inflation are set equal to 
zero:
dln _  (dltl/dTt){dset/dTTet+1) ,f dig dset
*t+i Vt ~ drt d-Ket+l ~
In other words, it is optimal in this case requires to drive the opportunity 
costs of holding money, i.e. the nominal interest rate, to zero so as to 
guarantee that individuals hold the satiation level of real balances:
h+1 = i't+1 + (1 + r(+1)7T(e+1 = 0 = >  7r(e+1 = — + «  - r t+1. (44)
t +Tt+1
The optimal expected inflation rate thus ought to be (approximately) 
equal to the negative real interest rate. This is the Friedman (1969) rule 
of optimal deflation which requires a contraction of the money supply in
55Not that this is not the standard form of the unit elasticity rule since the money 
demand is usually modeled to depend on the expected inflation rate rather than the 
on nominal interest rate.
56Apart from Cagan (1956), the seigniorage maximizing inflation rate has been 
discussed by, among others, Friedman (1971), Auernheimer (1974), Carthcart (1974), 
Calvo (1978), Siegel (1981), Auernheimer (1983), Calvo and Fernandez (1983), Brock 
(1984), Grossman and Van Huyck (1986), Neumann (1992), and Bordo and Redish 
(1993). Moreover. Easterley, Mauro and Schmidt-Hebbel (1992) provide a detailed 




























































































any period and leads to negative seigniorage revenues, which are financed 
through output taxation.57 Intuitively, it comes about, because there is 
now a loss free revenue available through which all expenditure can be 
financed. Since money is produced without costs, it should thus be sup­
plied until satiation is reached.58
3. The ratios of the marginal collection costs to marginal rev­
enues for both instruments are of the same order of magnitude:
Expenditures are then optimally financed from the revenues accruing from 
both instruments. As mentioned above, the optimal use of either taxa­
tion instrument is determined by the relative ratios of the marginal tax 
revenues to the marginal social losses. In particular, positive inflation 
rates are part of the optimal policy.
5.3  Som e G eneralizations to E quilibrium  M od els  
of O ptim al Taxation
Having studied the optimal inflation tax above, the question remains as 
to whether the results given are a consequence of the simplicity of our 
model. Needless to say that the use of a general equilibrium framework 
would certainly be more satisfactory, in a more complete analysis, our 
tax on exogenous output ought to be substituted by a distortionary labor 
or consumption tax. However, one would expect that the introduction of 
additional social costs from output taxes would strengthen the case for 
a positive optimal inflation rate. This appears at least to be true when 
collecting the tax involves positive costs.59 The results of our cases 1. 
and 3. thus generalize to general equilibrium models.
Following this intuition would also lead to the conclusion that it no 
longer remains optimal to follow the Friedman (1969) rule in case 2. if
57The Friedman rule has sometimes also been called the optimum quantity of money 
rule or the Chicago rule.
58This parallels the usual argument that in a welfare optimum, whatever is de­
manded be supplied of goods that are costless to produce.




























































































a consumption or labor income tax distorts the endogenous labor/leisure 
choice, thereby causing social losses irrespectively of the magnitude of 
collection costs. Phelps (1973) and essentially all authors who introduce 
money into general equilibrium by modeling it as an argument of the 
utility function have supported this view and reached the conclusion that 
positive inflation rates are even optimal in the absence of significant col­
lection costs.60 On the other hand, the money-in-the-utility-function 
approach has often been criticized for it does not appear to be convincing 
that individuals derive utility just from holding money.61 As an alterna­
tive, Drazen (1979) and Leach (1983) have suggested modeling money as 
an intermediate input good of a transaction technology, yielding transac­
tions services and thereby decreasing the time necessary for unproductive 
shopping activities. Following this idea, Guidotti and Vegh (1993) have 
shown that the optimal inflation rate in general is still positive.62 On 
the other hand, as usual, there is an exception from the rule: if labor is 
taxed in a general equilibrium model and the transactions technology ex­
hibits constant returns to scale, a zero inflation tax remains the optimal 
choice even under distortionary income taxation. This special case is the 
one, Kimbrough (1986a) and (1986b), exclusively dealt with. At times, 
many authors have thus concluded that the Friedman rule also holds in 
a general equilibrium framework when collection costs are negligible.63 
As Guidotti and Vegh (1993) have argued convincingly though, standard 
money demand theories do not yield to a transactions technology that 
satisfies the properties necessary to replicate Friedman’s result in a gen­
eral equilibrium framework. In general, a positive optimal inflation rate 
may thus also be optimal if the social costs of output taxation result 
from its distortions rather than from positive collection costs as in case 
3. above. However, it should be stressed that the results of Guidotti 
and Vegh (1993) should not be viewed as the “final wisdom” . On p. 
203, they themselves state: “On the other hand, given that the micro­
foundations of money demand still remain a controversial and, to a large
“ Compare Marty (1978), Chamley (1985), Persson et al. (1987), or Aizenman 
(1993).
61See, for example, Lucas (1986) or Phelps (1989).
62See also Faig (1988), Faig (1991) and Chari, Christiano and Kehoe (1993).




























































































extent, unexplored territory, we do not wish to conclude that the infla­
tion tax is likely to be always positive. Rather, we feel that until the 
microfoundations of the transactions technology are further explored and 
the profession reaches something of an consensus, no definite conclusions 
should be drawn.”
6 Conclusion
In this paper, a simple version of the intertemporal optimal tax problem 
of the public sector was discussed, in which a given stream of expenditure 
needs to be financed through output taxation and seigniorage so as to 
minimize the social losses both instruments induce. It was shown how 
the time consistency problem of the optimal solution to this problem can 
be cured by the application of a modified and simplified version of the 
Persson et al. (1987) asset management scheme. Following this policy 
turned out to be not only necessary but also sufficient for the existence of 
a unique time consistent optimal policy, although this is not true in more 
general models.64
Apart from this, the different recommendations of the public finance 
literature on optimal inflation were found as specific cases of the general 
time consistent policy when public assets and debt are appropriately man­
aged. The assumption of precommitment usually made was not neces­
sary to arrive at this result. Furthermore, it was shown that when taxing 
output involves collection costs, the optimal taxation package contains 
both, output and inflation taxation. This replicates the classical result of 
Phelps (1973), who, however, was not concerned with time consistency 
problems. Only in extreme cases, in which the ratio of the marginal loss 
of one instrument to its marginal revenue clearly dominates this of the 
other, it does turn out to be optimal to rely Almost exclusively on the 
revenue source with the lower marginal loss to revenue ratio.
What are the policy conclusions that can be drawn from these re­
64Calvo and Obstfeld (1990) have shown that Persson, Persson, and Svensson’s 




























































































suits? First, it is important to stress that positive inflation rates of “mod­
erate” magnitude are not necessarily an undesirable outcome of an infla­
tionary bias, which would arise in a discretionary equilibrium. As has 
been argued above, moderate positive inflation rates may well arise in 
the time consistent second best equilibrium as the optimal outcome when 
the output tax system is inefficient. A large underground economy, for 
instance, strengthens the case for positive inflation, because inflation may 
be the only possibility to indirectly tax the shadow economy. Programs 
with the goal to reduce inflation ought to take account of this fact in that 
they put emphasis on the improvement of the output and excise taxation 
system. This is likely to be an important issue in most of the states in 
Eastern Europe.65
Second, Persson et al. (1987)’s suggestions offer two possibilities of 
how the authority may decrease its incentive to resort to inflation sur­
prises. On the one hand, it may restrict direct and indirect borrowing of 
the government from the central bank as much as possible. This would 
allow the central bank to build up a portfolio of nominal private assets, 
which, at least, partly could help to reduce the net nominal liabilities 
of the public sector.66 On the other hand, the authorities ought to be 
encouraged to issue indexed bonds. A casual reflection might lead to 
the conclusion that this instrument has hardly been used in the OECD 
countries.67 However, many countries have actually indexed a quite sub­
stantial share of their public sector debt indirectly-by denominating it
65Dornbusch and Fischer (1993) report evidence that successful stabilizations from 
high to moderate inflation rates have often been accompanied by drastic improve­
ments of the efficiency of the tax system. On the other side, Cukierman, Edwards 
and Tabellini (1992) have analyzed why the authorities may not be eager to devote 
resources to a reform of the tax system. They argue that it can be optimal for the 
authority in a politically unstable and polarized economy not to reform the tax sys­
tem. The reason for this is that the gains of such a reform are likely to be inherited by 
its successor public sector, which probably uses them for purposes not appreciated by 
the current public sector. The casual empirical observation that politically unstable 
countries often are also the ones with high inflation rates seems to suggest support of 
this view.
66Note that the German Bundesbank is not allowed to directly lend to the govern­
ment and that open market purchases of domestic government bonds are only possible 
under very restrictive conditions.




























































































in foreign currencies. This is similar to an ex post indexation to infla­
tion since the standard open economy macro-models would predict that 
foreign currency debt cannot be devalued by surprise inflation. Infla­
tion surprises are rather likely to create a real exchange rate depreciation 
as a consequence of an overshooting reaction of the nominal exchange 
rate. This would increase the real value of foreign currency public debt 
as perceived from the domestic country’s point of view and even reduce 
the incentive to resort to unexpected inflation. Further research in this 
direction seems promising.
At the end of this review the limited scope of the public finance 
approach to determine optimal inflation rates should be stressed. Of 
course, there are other important determinants of monetary policy and 
it may be already to much of an abstraction to take the inflation rate as 
the policy instrument that can be perfectly controlled.68 In addition, the 
framework used here is extremely monetaristic, that is, prices are perfectly 
flexible and output is not all affected by inflation, even if inflation is 
completely unexpected. In my opinion, rather than depriving the public 
finance approach to the determination of optimal inflation “as one of 
the most overstudied areas in monetary theory” [Summers (1991)], one 
should therefore interpret the results with some care. After all, economic 
models are not supposed to tell the truth but to organize thinking. As an 
example, even if the Friedman rule turns out to be the optimal choice in 
public finance models, objectives of monetary policy not modeled there, 
for instance stabilization goals or exchange rate targets, may well prevent 
its implementation in practise. On the other hand, public finance models 
of optimal inflation can well explain why it may not even be desirable 
to reduce inflation in countries which badly developed taxation systems 
before the institutions have not been reformed. As I have argued, this 
will have important implications for the design of an optimal policy.





























































































This appendix comprises the technical details of the derivation of (13) 
and (14). First, observe that
Pt =  (1 +  O P - 1, (A.l)
■f) =  (i +  ^t)P !_i — \~r~\Pt ■ (A -2)1 +  7T(c
In addition, remember that we have denoted nominal variables by upper 
case and real variables by lower case letters; for example c, =  Ct/Pf 
Using these identities and (7), (8 ), equation (12) can be rewritten:
xt
AM, +  it{Bf_j +  C,_i) -  A {B f  +  Ct) -  O,
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~ Ct~ Ot
=  ( i + W i  w + i) -  h « )  -  u + + c<-i)]i + î , 1
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Then, we put (A.3) into (3) and rearrange:
9t +  T T — 6‘ - i  =  TtVt +  {b\ot -  b f) +  [(1 +  7T(+i)m <+i(7r(e+1) -  c,]1+7Tt L J
-  [m(« )  -  (1 +  r , ) ^  +  C -0 ] -  (A.4)
1 +  7T< L J
If we now bring bf_l on the left side and use 6,_i =  6)°  ̂ — bf_1, we get: 
gt +  +  r<)6<-i =  TtVt +  bt+  [(1 +  7r(+i)rn«+1(7rt+1) -  ct]
1 4 - 7T( L J
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Appendix B
We now prove that, under the assumption of a seigniorage Laffer curve, 
any set of the policy instruments that satisfies the first order conditions
the social loss function.
Remembering that the social losses were assumed to be convex in 
the policy instruments and that A( must be positive in an optimum, we 
can sign most of the second derivatives of the Hamiltonian (38) without 
further assumptions:
That %7r'+1A, is positive follows directly from (39.b), because for an opti­
mum the expected inflation rate has to lie on the left side of the seigniorage 
Laffer curve. The sign of causes the only problem:
However, when the expected seigniorage revenues exhibit a Laffer curve, 
this expression is negative, again because the expected inflation rate is





























































































not larger than the seigniorage maximizing inflation rate. Under the 
Laffer curve assumption, we therefore find that, whenever the first order 
conditions are fulfilled, the bordered Hessian satisfies the second order 
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